A new paper was published by Emese Braun and Tamás Sebestyén. In terms of sustainability, this paper examines the effect of conformity and network structure on the emergence of cooperation. The results suggest that the relational structure of individuals, especially because of the presence of conformists, and the initial cooperation intensity of the society play a significant role in the degree of cooperation that emerges in the equilibrium state. In addition the network structure and the proportion of conformists can influence the effectiveness of a potential incentive mechanism considerably.
Abstract
Cooperative behavior is a determining part of everyday life that can be influenced by a number of factors. Among these, the present paper focuses on network reciprocity and conformity. The starting point is a one-shot multi-player prisoner’s dilemma game which distinguishes between conformist and rational behavior, where the latter is known from the classical game. The results suggest that the relational structure of individuals, especially because of the presence of conformists, and the initial cooperation intensity of the society play a significant role in the degree of cooperation that emerges in the equilibrium state of the game. The paper also presents the analysis of changing incentives through a specific reward mechanism proportional to the network degree of players, which facilitates higher cooperation intensity through spill-over effects.